Wow for the Month of May 2014 - President Barack Obama Visits the PH "Quotes"





US President Barack Obama arrived in the Philippines on Monday, April 28, and disembarked from Air Force One at 1:41 pm at AGES Aviation Center, Balagbag Ramp in Pasay City.



At a joint press conference in Manila, President Obama insisted the deal was not about thwarting China’s rise.

“Our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain China. Our goal is to make sure international rules and norms are respected, and that includes in the area of international disputes,”  he said.

"The goal for this agreement is to build Philippine capacity to engage in training, engage in coordination, not simply to deal with issues of maritime security, but also to enhance our capabilities so that if there is a natural disaster that takes place we can respond quickly," Obama told a joint news conference in Manila after talks with President Benigno Aquino.

“Our commitment to defend the Philippines is ironclad and the United States will keep that commitment, because allies never stand alone,”

 Obama told Philippine and US troops at a packed military gymnasium in Fort Bonifacio, as a multiethnic backdrop of camouflaged soldiers stood behind him on stage.

“Through our treaty alliance, the United States has an ironclad commitment to defend you, your security and your independence,”

Obama told an audience of dignitaries in the presidential palace, including President Benigno Aquino III, referring to the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two nations.



"Let me be absolutely clear. For more than 60 years, the United States and the Philippines have been bound by a mutual defense treaty. And this treaty means our two nations pledge—and I’m quoting—our ‘common determination to defend themselves against external armed attacks, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone," he said

"Deepening our alliance is part of our broader vision for the Asia Pacific,

 We believe that nations and peoples have the right to live in security and peace, and to have their sovereignty and territorial integrity respected.”  Obama said.

"We believe that international law must be upheld, that freedom of navigation must be preserved and commerce must not be impeded. We believe that disputes must be resolved peacefully and not by intimidation or force. That’s what our nations stand for. That’s the future we’re working for,” Obama said.

“Along with your civilian partners, you rushed into the disaster zone, pulled people from the rubble, delivered food and medicine. You showed what friends can do when we take care of each other,” he said.

“Sadly, the proud service of many of these Filipino veterans was never fully recognized by the United States,” he said. “It was an injustice.”

It was during Obama’s administration that a law was passed the provided compensation to nearly 20,000 Filipino veterans from World War II and their families.

“It was the right thing to do,” Obama said.

Toolbox 14- Rollover Protective Structures (ROPS)




Objective:
To understand risk of tractor overturns, and the effectiveness of the proper use of ROPS.

Trainer's Note:

Discuss safe driving practices for farm tractors and machinery. Focus on the following safety precautions in preventing rollovers.

Background

Tractor rollovers account for 50% of tractor related fatalities in the United States. Distracted operators, speed, and rough or uneven ground are leading causes of tractor rollover. Rollover protective structures (ROPS ) became available for tractors in the mid 1960's and were not available for all new tractors until the mid-70's. However, they were not standard equipment on new tractors until 1985. Many tractors built before that time are still in use and they contribute to the tractor fatality rate because they are not ROPS and seat belt equipped. Use of ROPS and seatbelt are 99.9% effective in preventing deaths due to tractor overturns.

OSHA requires ROPS and seatbelts to be installed on all tractors operated by employees.

For tractors that are not equipped with a ROPS, check with the manufacturer or dealer for the Trainer's Note: Discuss safe driving practices for farm tractors and machinery. Focus on the following safety precautions in preventing rollovers. availability of ROPS retrofit kits. If they are available, the tractor should be retrofitted. Install and use seat belts on tractors with ROPS. Seatbelts ensure that the operator stays within the "zone of protection" offered by the ROPS during a tractor mishap. Seatbelts should not be used on tractors without ROPS. Rollover protective structures do not prevent rollovers, but 99.9% effective in preventing death or serious injury. Distracted operators, speed, slopes, and uneven ground are leading causes of tractor rollover.

There are two types of rollover protective structures:

• Rollover Protective Frame
• Rollover Protective Enclosure

Rollover Protective Frame

These are either two or four post frames which are securely mounted to the main body of the tractor. Use the provided seat belt to keep the operator within the protected area.
Rollover Protective Enclosure
A rollover protective enclosure utilizes the protective frame, but totally encloses the frame with metal and glass. Seat belts are provided and must be used to contain the operator within the protected area. In addition, this cab enclosure gives protection from weather, dust, noise and vibration.

Enclosures on older tractors were designed for operator comfort not for rollover protection and they are not considered ROPS. ROPS must meet regulations and standards that certify that they provide adequate protection in a tractor rollover. To find out if a frame or enclosure is certified, look for a certification label, contact the manufacturer, or check for the presence of a manufacturer installed seatbelt.

Reducing the risk of a side rollover:

• Set wheels as far apart as possible.
• Lock the brake pedals together before high speed road travel.
• Match speed to operating conditions and loads. Do not let the front wheels bounce.
• Slow down before turning.
• Use engine braking when going downhill.
• Avoid crossing steep slopes. Watch for depressions on the downhill side and bumps on the uphill side. Turn downhill, not uphill, if stability becomes a problem.
• Stay at least as far from ditches and rivers as banks are deep.
• Keep front-end loader buckets as low as possible when moving.
• If right front tire goes off the road into the ditch--turn downward rather than attempting to turn back onto the roadway.

Reducing the risk for rear overturn:

• Always hitch loads at the drawbar.
• Use front weights to increase tractor stability.
• Start forward motion slowly and change speed gradually.
• If possible, avoid backing downhill.
• Drive around ditches.
• Back out or be towed out of ditches or mud.

Review the Following Points

• Install and use seat belts on tractors with ROPS.
• ROPS do not prevent rollovers from occurring.
• Most rollovers involve tractor speed, operator error, or unsafe driving conditions.
• Follow safety steps to prevent rollovers.

Boycott Products “Made In China”

Posted on August 20, 2012 by pinoytekkie

Let us export globally our damnation of China’s expansionist ambitions in southeast Asia. Send emails to all people you know about the several instances of China bullying (namely the Spratlys Islands and Scarborough Shoal) and encourage them to avoid buying China products especially the Chinese brands. They are just copycats and questionable reliability made by hands of underpaid and overworked Chinese masses.

A China products boycott will be symbolic since our economy is dominated by Chinese products, as well as Chinese and “Chinoy” businessmen. Come to think of it, why not boycott also Chinoy producers who would not sign a “Defend Philippine sovereignty and ASEAN Seas zone of peace and security”?
There are three types of Chinese government bullying:
1) encroachment on our territorial land or waters;
2) encroachment on our EEZ; and
3) encroachment on areas where we have a claim but which may not yet be part of our internationally-recognized territory.

All forms of bullying must be resisted but the forms of resistance should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense. Further, the fight against the Chinese government bully is not only our fight. China’s claim on the SEA sea lanes is an affront not only to the Philippines but to the world. Thus, we must enlist the participation of the international community in condemning Chinese bully tactics in the SEA seas. This fight is not only our fight but the fight of all people of the world against the Chinese government bully.
China’s attempt to restrain us through bilateralism as a divide-and-rule tactic is an attempt to bully each SEA country one by one. Multilateralism is the best way: resolve the dispute through international law and the international courts, that the solution must be through the United Nations because China’s claims also involve claims on the world’s common sea lanes and, thus, every country of the world is a stakeholder.

A bilateral solution to the problem is not possible. Several years of experience on how China have dealt with the Philippines have shown that China has been bullying our country. We have to face China with the other nations of the world and use international laws and courts. China has massacred their Vietnamese proletarian brothers several years ago. There is no basis at all that they would be kinder to the Philippines. In 1988 the Chinese used battleships for firing with 37-mm anti-aircraft guns directly at the unarmed and light armed Vietnamese sailors and engineers on a reef in the Spratly Islands. Sixty four were killed. They have threatened to launch “small-scale war” against the Philippines. They have also bullied and continue to bully Vietnam even today, extending to areas outside of Paracel Islands. It is really a mistaken view that our conflict with China can be settled by a mere chit-chat between the two countries even if I also believe that the chit-chat can still continue while multilateral measures are also executed.
It is like a muscular husband bullying his petite young wife, using force, intimidation, deception, and ruse. Dialogues between the husband and the wife are no longer adequate. We must avail the international courts, international law, and the United Nations as a collective. Call for a bilateral dialogue is Chinese ruse and we have learned that for several years that the Chinese has been using tricks on us.

Among the possible deterrents of a Chinese attack are strong expression of support by all countries of the world and we should welcome all those who provide strong messages of support in our favor. We need not be afraid of an American bully if we are appealing to ALL nations of the world.
China and the Philippines and third parties especially the UN should at least agree to a common monitoring system through which actual situations at the disputed waters are observed in real time on satellite videos, so that the actions of opposing forces at sea are directly controlled in real time by their respective top commands. This may prevent accidents and miscalculations, if this is not yet already being done, imho.
Let us work on this or popularize the call “”Enjoin all country claimants to solve territorial disputes through peaceful means and through the international courts such as the ITLOS/UNCLOS, advance a United Nations co-implemented Code of Conduct in the SEA seas in the interim!” in which what you are saying just now are some of the concrete details.

The key question is: how do we compel or force China to sit at the negotiating table? Their strategy had been to deal with us individually, knowing that they do not have the moral ascendancy to face a multilateral group, either an ad hoc or the UN itself. Notice that China had repeatedly declared that it does not, it would not, recognize UNCLOS, neither any international court, neither the UN brokered arbitration, and I am sure neither any group of countries e.g., Japan, US, Australia, or Indonesia. (In fact, I doubt whether Australia would even lift a finger). It is not to say that we should not push for them. I am just saying that we ought to prepare for something beyond.
I say we intensify our criticism of the expansionist/bully policies of that government, call on the world to exercise various types of pressure on the country (such as boycott of their goods), paint a brutally frank picture of their government domestically and abroad, and call on all Chinese to realize democracy in their country and end bullyism in Asia. That is probably one of the best way to end Chinese bullyism. Otherwise, the other possible scenario is ala Libya scenario for China. Thus, let us reach out to the Chinese people!
I think that the boycott would do some good. The ASEAN Code of Conduct would add pressure on China, and it would be good. I think the US would not be in any position to pressure China at this point, unless and until some violence would have occurred.
The boycott can be done simultaneously. The boycott is okay (It may or may not provide the punch but, at minimum, a boycott it will promote awareness and resolve among the population. If you notice, the call “Enjoin all country claimants to solve territorial disputes through peaceful means and through the international courts such as the ITLOS/UNCLOS, advance a United Nations co-implemented Code of Conduct in the SEA seas in the interim!” is also a DIPLOMATIC cum people’s organization’s call. I did not add the boycott in the calls because my intent is to communicate the call to the diplomatic community (our side and third parties). However, people’s organizations can combine the call with a call for boycott of Chinese goods.

We do advocate a peaceful resolution to the dispute with China, it is the best and only way we can fight for our right on these islands, China openly harass our people and our government by showing what they can do and how powerful they are, with their military and economic power, this bullying may have been the rule before or in ancient times, but in these modern times, maybe now, we’re in an entirely different ballgame. We now have to make use of our Filipino Chinese community, to call on their friends in mainland China to respect our sovereignty, and we do understand, this is not an easy task, as this will need some sacrifices, yes, but It seems this is the best time for them to prove that they are worthy of their being truly Filipinos with Chinese descents.
I hope the powerful think twice to bully the small and helpless countries. When the smaller countries speak, their combined voices are loud and clear. It is powerful! We must continue our protest as loud as we can so that everybody can help us and reverberate all the way to China so they can get the message!

China Products Are Cheap but Inferior Anyway

A few years ago, China made it to the world headlines a number of times courtesy of their substandard and contaminated products. Products ranging from lead-painted toys, toxic toothpaste, chemical-laden seafood, fake eggs, fake rice, unsafe tires, and counterfeited medicines among others were have to be recalled because of the risks they pose to their consumer’s health and welfare.
And this year, China have once again proved to the world that it’s really a headline superstar when it comes to unsafe products, thanks to its Melamine tainted milk that has already killed a number of babies and hospitalized thousands more.
Want to avoid food poisoned with Melamine?http://www.beaconoftruth.com/melamine.htm
The alternative to boycotting China http://globalnation.inquirer.net/47001/the-alternative-to-boycotting-china

Panawagan:

Mga kapwa Pilipino, ito ang dapat tiyakin natin, kahit na may mga simbolikong aksiyon na dapat tayong ilunsad (halimbawa: maaring umabot sa pagyurak sa kanilang bandila): Hinding-hindi at kailanman hindi tayo bababa at dapat magpatupad tayo ng disiplina sa ating hanay, hindi tayo magrara-RIOT at hindi tayo mananakit ng sibilyang Tsino sa ating bayan. Dapat tiyakin natin ang kaligtasan ng mga INOSENTE. Ang kaaway natin ay ang gobyernong Tsino, ang gobyerno ng bagong imperyalismo sa Asya at hindi ang sibilyang mamamayang Tsino!

Japan voices support as Philippines stake claim on territory vs. China

by: Japan Daily Press- John Hofilena 02 April 2014

Japanese Destroyer JS Shirane dock at Manila South Harbor for joint naval exercise 02 Abril 2014 ~ Photo credit to Alexis Romero

Japan has declared its support for the Philippines as it strengthens its claim on territory that is also claimed by China. The Southeast Asian nation had recently filed a 4,000-page claim document – backed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – before an international tribunal. Japan’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement of support, saying that Manila had Tokyo’s support in its claim for disputed territories in the South China Sea. Japan is also in a long-term dispute with China over the sovereignty of an uninhabited island chain in the East China Sea.

On Monday, Japan’s Foreign Ministry released a statement saying that the Philippines’ move to strengthen its claim is a step towards stability in the region. “The issue with regard to the South China Sea is directly related to the peace and stability of the region and is a common concern of the international community as a whole since the issue influences the international maritime order,” Japan pointed out in its statement. It also emphasized the Japanese government’s support towards the Philippines. “The Government of Japan supports the Philippines’ use of procedures under the UNCLOS aiming at peaceful settlement of disputes on the basis of international law, as such an action contributes to the maintenance and enhancement of the international order in the region based on the rule of law,” the statement declared.



2 big ships of Chinese Coast Guard within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone on a cat and mouse chase of a Philippine Navy Vessel AM 700. The latter successfully scaped and managed to docked beside the stranded BRP Sierra Madre WWII war ship to supplies fresh Philippine Marine troops on disputed Ayungin Shoal .

The move from Manila is most likely a response to actions that happened on Saturday, when two Chinese Coast Guard vessels blocked a Philippine civilian ship en route to bring supplies and troops to one of the disputed areas. Recently, there have been some confrontations that have observers concerned that the area might become a flash point in the region. Early this year, a number of confrontations between Chinese military vessels and the Japanese Coast Guard in and around the area of the Senkaku Islands sparked the same feelings of concern in the region.

The Philippine Star- Obama visit to Phl, Asia seen as counterweight to China

By Elaine Kurtenbach (Associated Press) | Updated April 23, 2014 - 8:46am





FILE - In this Sept. 24, 2010 file photo, U.S. President Barack Obama, left, greets ASEAN leaders, Philippines President Benigno Aquino III, center, and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak before a luncheon in New York. As the U.S. shifts more of its military assets into the Pacific region under new defense guidelines, it is stepping up cooperation with many Southeast Asian nations, including Malaysia. AP/Susan Walsh, File



TOKYO — President Barack Obama's travels through Asia in coming days aim to reassure partners about the renewed U.S. commitment to the region, with an eye both to China's rising assertiveness and the fast-growing markets that are the center of gravity for global growth.

The question: Will it be enough?

Nearly seven months after he cancelled an Asian tour due to the U.S. government shutdown, Obama's failure to prevent Russia from annexing Crimea has sharpened concerns that America lacks the will or wherewithal to follow through on its much-touted "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific.

"Words come easy," said Philippine political analyst Ramon Casiple. "But U.S. allies would want to know what help they can get when things reach a point of no return."

The United States has been stepping up regional military deployments, but has made less progress on rebalancing through broader diplomatic and economic initiatives, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a Pacific Rim free trade agreement.

Obama arrives in Tokyo on Wednesday for the first state visit to America's closest ally in Asia by a U.S. president since Bill and Hillary Clinton came in 1996. He will be the first sitting U.S. president to visit Malaysia since Lyndon Johnson in 1966. Allies South Korea and the Philippines, the two other stops on his agenda, are also keen to shore up security ties.

U.S. allies wonder if America has adequate capability to back them up in territorial rifts with China, Caspile says, given Washington's budget problems and preoccupation with crises elsewhere.

"The American objective is to reassure countries that ... America is here to stay and is going to keep a strong interest in dealing with China together with those countries," said Koichi Nakano, a political science professor at Tokyo's Sophia University.

A report released last week by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged that more effort and money be devoted to upgrading alliances in the Asia-Pacific. "A successful rebalance must underscore the strategic message that the policy represents an enduring U.S. commitment to the region, assuring our partners that we are in it for the long haul," it said.

Striving to allay Japan's worries over its territorial dispute with China and missile launches by North Korea, during a recent Asian tour U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel pledged two more ballistic missile defense destroyers for Japan by 2017. In a further show of solidarity, Hagel rebuked Beijing for escalating its territorial dispute with Tokyo over Japanese-controlled islands in the East China Sea that Japan calls the Senkaku islands and China calls the Diaoyu islands.

The U.S. is obligated to protect Japan from attack, but has sought to avoid taking a stand on sovereignty over the islands. Tokyo is hoping for more in the way of confidence building, says Hitoshi Tanaka, chairman of the Institute for International Strategy in Tokyo.

"We would like to see the president make a strong, clear statement about the Senkaku," said Tanaka. "There is a need for Japan and the U.S. to work to improve the security situation in East Asia."

Obama's two-night stay in Tokyo — just enough for the state visit the Japanese had pushed for — in itself sends a good message, said Matake Kamiya, a professor at the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, near Tokyo.

"It's important not only for the psychology of the Japanese but also for the impression given to the Chinese and North Koreans," he said.

The U.S. has 50,000 troops in Japan and about 28,500 deployed in South Korea, where it just concluded joint U.S.-South Korean exercises. But Tokyo and Seoul remain at odds over a separate territorial dispute and lingering Korean resentment of Japanese aggression before and during World War II.

Getting an early start on fence-mending, Obama brought Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye together for their first face-to-face meeting since they both took office over a year ago, on the sidelines of a recent nuclear security summit in The Hague.

A visit by Abe in December to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines 14 convicted war criminals among 2.5 million war dead, irked the U.S. and angered both South Korea and China.

At least two members of Abe's Cabinet, and dozens of other lawmakers, paid respects at the shrine just days before Obama's arrival in visits the South Korean side described as "deplorable." But the leaders' attention may well be diverted by a tragic ferry sinking, which left more than 300 missing or dead, most of them teenagers.

The United States already has a free-trade agreement with South Korea, which is likely to eventually join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Both the U.S. and Japan had hoped to announce "substantial progress" on the pact by the time of Obama's visit despite conflicts over tariffs on farm products and automobiles. Officials signaled Tuesday that a breakthrough was unlikely.

A TPP deal with Japan is vital for making headway with the other 10 countries in the trade bloc, which includes Malaysia, the third stop on Obama's swing through Asia, the market for about 60 percent of U.S. exports.

"Obama has two main agendas on this trip, which are to reaffirm the U.S. 'pivot' policy on Asia and to close the final hurdles for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement," said James Chin, a political analyst with Monash University in Malaysia.

As the U.S. shifts more of its military assets into the Pacific region under new defense guidelines, it is stepping up cooperation with many Southeast Asian nations, including Malaysia.

Though Kuala Lumpur's treatment of opposition politicians is complicating matters, Washington wants improved ties with Malaysia, whose majority Muslims adhere to a moderate form of Islam. The U.S. has taken a leading role in the Indian Ocean hunt for the Malaysia Airlines jet that vanished on March 8 with 239 people on board.

Chinese naval exercises near the James Shoal, just 80 kilometers (50 miles) off the coast of Malaysia's Sarawak state, have strained Malaysia's resolve to avoid confrontation over territorial disputes.

Both the U.S. and Japan have stepped up support for the Philippines, the last stop on Obama's eight-day journey, with Tokyo offering retired coast guard cutters to help fend off intrusions by Chinese naval vessels near still other disputed islands in the South China Sea.

The Philippines is negotiating with Washington for a beefed up security agreement to allow more access for U.S. troops, ships and aircraft to detect and deter such incursions. U.S. bases in the Philippines closed when the country ended their leases in 1992, though the two sides have an agreement allowing limited U.S. troop visits, mainly in the south where Filipino troops are battling militants.

China’s 9-dash line has no legal basis: int’l experts

tuoitrenews

Updated : 11/28/2012 15:00 GMT + 7

Many French and European experts in foreign policies and politics have said that the "U-shaped line", also known as nine-dotted or nine-dash line, drawn by China over the East Sea has no legal basis, according to a conference in France last month.

It would be a serious mistake to assume that the conflicts in the East Sea just involve regional countries. It has the potential to be a world-scale conflict, said researcher Patrice Jorland, a veteran expert on Southeast Asia.
The event, organized by the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) and Gabriel Peri Foundation, a reputable research organization specializing in political issues in France, attracted leading experts in France and Europe.
The conflicts in the East Sea have long been simmering, but became intensified in 2009.
"The sea and land areas around the East Sea has now become a new El Dorado with huge economic potentials for maritime fisheries and mining industries with rare minerals such as rare earths and gas, not to mention huge biological resources from marine flora and fauna, said Cyrille P. Coutansais, deputy of maritime law office of the General Staff of the French Navy.
“As above-ground resources are being depleted, regional countries are heading towards the sea, which has yet to be exploited,” he added.
“So as not to let such a resource-rich area fall into the hands of the mightier, there must be law and conventions defining the rules of the game there," Coutansais said, citing the 1958 Geneva Convention and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS).
"Only international laws can resolve all the related disputes in a fair, sustainable, and respectable manner by all involving parties,” he added.

Why call it “South China Sea”?

As a guide to the debate, researcher Patrice Jorland, collaborator of International Research Journal of France, emphasized the way the Western world called the East Sea as "South China Sea" or “China Sea" has created misunderstandings and a source of conflict.
“This name was given by European cartographers and navigators centuries ago during their expeditions to discover new land.”
“It is ambiguous. This term does not match the current geopolitical situation and creates the impression that this maritime area belongs to China. But such impression is completely wrong.”
Even though the name of a territory may contain a word relating to a certain country, it does not mean this territory belongs to that country, explained Patrice Jorland.
“Everyone knows it, except perhaps China. Thus, in 2009, China showed their "U-shaped line" map to the United Nations.
The U-shaped map "in any case cannot constitute the legal evidence for sovereignty," said Prof. Erik Franckx of the Department of International and European Law from the Vrije Universiteit Brussels.
"Regarding law, it is not enough to declare state sovereignty over any piece of land or territories with any maps or names provided by a country,” he said.
"The reference authority of the UN, the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), finds no hydrographic and scientific symbol on the map provided by China, he said, referring to the map of the East Sea that China provided to the UN in 2009.
“According to IHO as well as my personal point of view, China's U-shaped map is ambiguous, lacks the technical accuracy and therefore has no legal basis."
Concurring with the opinions of other legal experts at the workshop criticizing China's claims, law professor David Scott of Brunel University (UK) said: "When presenting the U-shaped map to the United Nations, China wants to formalize and legitimize” its sea demands.
“But at the same time China refused to give technical evidence for the maps, refused to comply with UNCLOS and do not want to bring the disputes with neighboring countries to any international arbitration institution.”

“We will never provide any specific evidence”

The observation of David Scott is echoed by the analysis of Prof. Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, a specialist in public law and political science at the University Paris Diderot.
She recalled a meeting in Beijing with senior Chinese officials three years ago when they told her: "We will never provide any specific evidence [about the U-shaped map] and we will never go to court for it! The waters are ours, why must we demonstrate or prove it?"
Prof. Monique Chemillier-Gendreau admitted she was then "shocked" at the disrespectful attitude to the international rights and agreements to which China is a signatory.
“China cannot provide any scientific evidence for what they claim because they have nothing in their hands," she said.
In the case of territorial claims in modern times, the current settlement is based on what is known as "customary law".
China only referred to the islands in the East Sea “in a document dating back to 1930, while the emperors of Annam [the precursor of Vietnam] already draw cadastral maps of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes from the 17th century.”
“That means in terms of legal and verifiable evidence, the documents given by Vietnam are much older. Therefore, China does not want any international court of arbitration to step into the disputes”.

Let’s bring the case to the Hague

Prof. Monique Chemillier-Gendreau and Mr. Cyril P. Coutansais said that China is implementing a strategy called "I am already there, so I stay", or more precisely, “establishing the fact, step by step".
This strategy has happened with a number of other countries which are getting tired of such disputes and will be ready to sign bilateral agreements beneficial to China.
"China believes that other countries involved in the dispute with it will finally be economically and financially exhausted in trying to modernize their army, and then they will let it go" said David Scott of the Brunel University.
Resolving the dispute through bilateral negotiations and settlement is the "secret" weapon of China.
As a result, Professor Franckx said that "if countries like the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries want to protect their territory, they must jointly bring China to international institutions to handle those disputes in multilateral manner. Bilateral negotiations and settlement only result in losses ".
Experts at the conference said that the proper and sustainable solution is to bring the case to the International Court of the Hague.

"As Vietnam and the Philippines also have territorial disputes with each other and with China, if Vietnam and the Philippines agree to bring the matter to an international court, China must also participate whether it likes it or not. In the current situation, maybe that's the best way to proceed. “ ~said Cyril P. Coutansais

China's "peaceful rise" - Suspicions about its super power ambitions

"China is the only major Asian country that has fought wars with all its land neighbours and claims to have done so in self-defence."

By Gurmeet Kanwal

China has inaugurated its rail link to Lhasa with pomp and show. It is undoubtedly a technological marvel, though one that will be difficult to maintain over the long term. The new railway line is ostensibly designed to open up Tibet to the world. It will also help the ruling Communist Party in China to substantially increase the number of Han Chinese that it settles every year in Tibet to change its demography.

Another cause for concern is China’s increased logistics capability to build up and sustain over a longer duration a much larger number of People’s Liberation Army divisions in Tibet. These extra divisions could be employed to further subdue the Tibetan people during peacetime and will be readily available in case of another border skirmish with India. Very few people realise that another incident like the limited fighting at Nathu La in 1967 and the Wang Dung stand-off in 1986 can lead to a border war as a result of the undemarcated Line of Actual Control.

China has termed its ongoing quest for a super power status a “peaceful rise”. However, China has never hesitated to employ military power to settle territorial and boundary disputes. It is the only major Asian country that has fought wars with all its land neighbours and claims to have done so in self-defence. China was involved in a vicious war in Korea in the 1950s. In 1962 China fought a border war with India that shattered the illusions of peaceful co-existence in Asia. It fought with Russia over a disputed island in the Assuri river. It invaded Vietnam to teach it a lesson and withdrew with a bloody nose.

China always speaks of its intentions for the peaceful re-unification of Taiwan with the mainland but does not hesitate to issue dire threats at the smallest sign of Taiwan’s quest for self-determination. It has fired surface-to-surface missiles into the Taiwan Straits and regularly practices amphibious landings. China has taken physical possession of some of the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea even though several other nations have much stronger claims. China was the world’s leading proliferator of nuclear weapons till A.Q. Khan’s antics propelled Pakistan to the top. Therefore, China’s emerging military capabilities must be seen in the light of its likely intentions in future.

It would be wrong to deduce that China is concentrating exclusively on enhancing its military power, which is now only one element of a nation’s ability to influence and shape the international environment. The Chinese leaders have for long propounded the concept of “comprehensive national power”. The Chinese are acutely conscious of the fact that they cannot hope to match the military muscle of the West for many more decades. They have been quick to realise that in future, as the world becomes increasingly globalised, interdependent and wired economic power will be the predominant determinant of a nation’s global status and its relative weight in the new world order. That is why the Chinese are working assiduously towards becoming an economic super power.

Simultaneously, China is modernising its armed forces to prepare for an option of the last resort, should Taiwan suddenly declare independence. In particular, the Chinese are acquiring offensive capabilities, including rapid reaction forces. The Chinese are unlikely to either invade Taiwan to secure its merger with the mainland or launch even missile and air strikes, as such action will have huge economic repercussions. New FDI will almost certainly stop; projects in the pipeline will be put on hold; some MNCs may even pull out; and the stock market will inevitably crash.

However, a naval and air blockade of Taiwan, though likely to invite UN sanctions, may appear attractive to the Chinese leadership. Cyber attacks, for which China has been preparing since the first Gulf War in 1991, are even more likely as these can completely disrupt the economy and provide inherent deniability.

Though Russia is the foremost supplier of military hardware to China, there has been no major military and strategic cooperation between the two countries. The relationship is basically a patron-client, buyer-seller relationship with limited transfer of technology to manufacture under license. It will be recalled that the Chinese had debunked former Russian Prime Minister Primakov’s proposal of a China-Russia-India triangle. However, the probability of a real convergence in the Chinese and Russian worldviews cannot be discounted. An overly pro-active US response will definitely ensure that the relationship graduates to a more meaningful strategic partnership, even if not a military alliance. Excessive US pressure will only drive the Chinese to up the ante a couple of notches in their rhetoric as well as their military preparations for the reunification of Taiwan.

Post-Cold War geopolitics is still in a state of flux. In the emerging poly-centric world order, new great powers will seek to counter US economic and military predominance. It will be prudent for the US to accommodate the new powers rather than confront them. At the same time, the US is unlikely to be overwhelmed either by the ongoing transition in power-politics or by the use of asymmetric warfare to counter its superior military power. The US can and must continue to utilise its economic clout and military muscle to exercise a stabilising international influence for the common good while dealing firmly with the so-called “states of concern” that threaten world peace and stability through WMD proliferation and international terrorism.

The emerging economic powerhouses like China and India will inevitably rise to take their rightful place as global players. Analysts in the West view China’s self-professed “peaceful rise” with suspicion and recommend a closer strategic partnership with India as a way of hedging US bets to counter-balance China’s influence in Asia. The best policy at present would be to continue to engage China as it integrates itself with the international economic order while keeping a close watch on its military ambitions and preparations.

The writer is Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

The Tribune, India July 18, 2006

China's "historic waters" in the South China Sea: an analysis from Taiwan, R.O.C.

By Yann-huei Song , Academia Sinica, Taiwan
and Peter Kien-hong Yu, National Sun Yat-sen University
American Asian Review Vol. 12, N.. 4, Winter, 1994 (pp. 83-101)

In January 1948, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) of the Republic of China (ROC) officially published a map-Nanhai zhudao weizhi tu (Map of Locations of South China Sea Islands)-on which a "U"-shaped line was drawn to enclose a large part of the waters of the South China Sea. 1 The four groups of South China Sea islands, namely, the Pratas (Dongsha), the Paracels (Xisha), the Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), and the Spratlys (Nansha), were enclosed by the line. Because no protests or opposition were expressed by the states concerned or the international community in general after the map was published, and the legal status of the enclosed waters has never been clarified by the ROC, questions concerning the nature of this "U"-shaped boundary line continue to be raised. Particularly since the naval skirmish between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in March 1988, questions regarding the legal status of the "U"-shaped line have been raised, with different opinions among scholars specializing in international law and politics in the ROC on Taiwan on what the line represents. 2 Recently scholars, and even government officials, from Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have began to raise questions about the "U"-shaped line. 3

Given the fact that the South China Sea territorial dispute has become one of the most important security problems in the region, and that the Chinese claim to a large part of the South China Sea as its "historic waters" will have a tremendous impact on the future delimitation of maritime boundaries in the area, deepening animosity among the six claimants-the PRC, the ROC, the SRV, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei-there is an urgent need to explore the issue thoroughly.

This article will examine the legal question of Taipei's claim to the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the "U"-shaped line as its "historic waters." After a discussion of the emergence and development of the ROC's claim, the concept and definition of historic waters will be examined. Thereafter, the nature of the "U"-shaped line and the legal status of the waters enclosed by the line will be considered. Finally, the potential impact of the ROC's claim on its relations with other Southeast Asian states will be evaluated.The "U"-shaped Line and China's "Historic Waters"
After France reasserted claims to the Paracels in 1931 and the Spratly islands in 1933, it was generally agreed that China had to take actions to defend its sovereignty over the island groups in the South China Sea. 4 As a result, a Review Committee for Sea and Land Maps was established in June 1933. Four months later, a revised "Review Regulation for Sea and Land Maps" was issued by the Executive Yuan of the ROC. In December 1934, the Committee started to review the names of South China Sea islands in both Chinese and English. And in April 1935, the Zhongguo Nanhai gedao yu tu (Map of the Islands of the South China Sea), believed to lye the first official Chinese map of the South China Sea, was published by the governments. 5

Between 1946 and 1947, the MOI conducted a further study of the situation in the South China Sea and, based upon information collected by the Nationalist navy, published a "Cross Reference Table of the New and Old Names of the South China Sea Islands" in December 1947, listing 159 islands or islets. In January 1948, the "Map of Locations of South China Sea Islands" on which a "U"-shaped line was drawn to encircle the four larger groups of the South China Sea islands as well as their surrounding waters was officially Published and became available to the public. Since then, this "U"-shaped line has been used in Chinese maps for the purpose of showing the boundary limit of the Chinese maritime areas and the Chinese claim to the South China Sea islands. 6 The line was drawn "arbitrarily" and there was no precise delimitation of this line by coordinates. However, for over four decades, no protests were issued by neighboring countries, whose interests were involved in the area encircled by the line, or by the international community in general. Scholars, Chinese or foreign, specializing in ocean law and politics, did not examine the question either. Although occasionally mentioning that the line indicated China's claim to the islands and maritime areas in the South China Sea, no one, to our knowledge, ever raised a question concerning the line during that time. Neither the ROC nor PRC governments clarified the nature of the line or the legal status of the waters enclosed. In recent years, however, the question was raised both in Taiwan and mainland China, and by other concerned states.

About one year after the naval skirmish between the PRC and Vietnam in 1988, the ROC's MOI established an ad hoc committee to help determine the basepoints and baselines to be used for measuring the breadth of the ROC's territorial seas. At the same time, another ad hoc committee was set up to help draft the ROC's laws on the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the territorial seas.7 It was these two ad hoc committees that raised the question of "historic waters" and the legal nature of the "U"-shaped line, but committee members were divided over the issue.
One group argued that the waters encircled by the "U"-shaped line should be claimed as China's historic waters. The reasons given were twofold: First no protests or opposition were issued when the map became available to the Public in 1948; and second, the claim to the enclosed waters as historic waters did not violate Article 47 (1) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which provides:

An archipelagic State may draw archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.

A second group opposed this position, arguing that China's historic waters claim could hardly be justified: The "U"-shaped line was drawn arbitrarily and it was impossible to locate the line at sea because of the lack of coordinates, causing difficulties in determining the legal status of the claimed waters. Also, the concept of "historic waters" was outdated and can hardly be used to support Taipei's claim." However, when the committee drafted Article 3 of the Draft Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the ROC it adopted the view that the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line are China's "historic waters."" Moreover, in the preamble of the Guidelines for Nanhai (South China Sea) Policy, approved by the Executive Yuan in April 1993, the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line were claimed as Chinese territory, subject to the jurisdiction of the ROC." Furthermore, in September 1993, a two-day conference on the South China Sea was held in Taipei and both the Interior Minister and the Premier, during the opening ceremony, reiterated that the waters of the South China Sea have long been the ROC's historic waters. 13 Although the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line are claimed as China's historic waters, the legal status of the area remains to be clarified-are they "internal waters," "territorial sea," "archipelagic waters," or something else ?

The question regarding the legal status of the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line has not only been raised by ROC scholars, but also by scholars from the member states of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For example, Dr. Hasjim Djalal, the former Director General of the Research and Development Agency and Indonesia's Ambassador to Germany, and Dr. B. A. Hamzah, Director General of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs (MIMA) both challenged Chinese claims at the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea hosted by Indonesia." Hamzah argued:

There are parties which have claimed the entire South China Sea as their own on the basis of antiquity. Such claims cannot be serious nor treated with much respect . . . . By no stretch of imagination can the South China Sea be considered by any nations as its internal waters or historic lake as a basis to assert claim. Since such area claims are frivolous, unreasonable and illogical, I urge the Parties concerned to drop area claims and focus instead on their claim to islands and non-islands. I would also urge all parties to reject claims to the entire South China Sea (referring to area claims) as there is no basis in law or history.15

Given the developments outlined above, the legal status of the waters of the South China Sea encircled by the "U"shaped line and claimed by the ROC as its historic waters must be examined. Before considering the legal status of the claimed waters, it is useful to briefly introduce the legal regime of historic waters under international law.The Concept and Definition of Historic Waters
According to the Yearbook of the Intentional Law Commission, the concept of "historic waters" :
has its root in the historic fact that States through ages claimed and maintained sovereignty over maritime areas which they considered vital to them without paying much attention to divergent and changing opinions about what general international law might prescribe with respect to the delimitation of the territorial sea. 16

Another study concluded that the doctrine of "historic waters" :

developed from that of historic bays which had emerged during the 19th century for the protection of certain large bays closely linked to the surrounding land area and traditionally considered by claiming States as part of their national territory. 17

Although the development of the concept of "historic waters" is closely related to the legal regime of historic bays, the terms "historic waters" and "historic bays" are not synonymous, "Historic waters" has a wider scope than "historic bays." Historic title can not only be applied to waters such as bays, but also to territorial seas, straits, archipelagos, and to all those waters which can generally be included in the maritime area of a coastal state .18

Although both concepts can be traced back to the 19th century, no generally accepted definitions exist for the two terms and the legal regimes of "historic bays" and "historic waters" have never been spelled out in any international conventions. In 1958, when the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1) was held in Geneva, the question concerning the meaning of the terms "historic bays" and "historic waters" was raised by the delegations from Japan, Panama, and India, as well as others. However, mainly because the participants generally believed that the Conference had neither sufficient material nor time to deal with the problem properly, the UNCLOS I ended by adopting a resolution requesting the UN to arrange for the study of the legal regime of "historic waters," including "historic bays." Although the UNCLOS I decided not to address the question concerning the definition of the two terms, it inserted safeguard provisions in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone adopted in the Conference, thereby recognizing the legitimacy of both "historic waters" and "historic bays."
In 1962, the UN Secretariat published a study, entitled "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays" in Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 19 The study cited the Fisheries Case between the United Kingdom and Norway to support the theory that "historic waters" are not limited to bays. The study suggested that title to "historic waters" should be considered independently on its own merits and when the theory of "historic waters" is considered, "one should avoid . . . bas[ing] any proposed principles or rules on the alleged exceptional character of such waters." 'the study also examined the elements of title to "historic waters," the issues of burden of proof, the legal status of waters regarded as "historic waters," and the settlement of disputes. However, it points out that, although the discussion of the principles and rules of international law relating to the legal regime seems to justify a number of conclusions, some of the conclusions are "highly tentative and more in the nature of bases of discussion than results of an exhaustive investigation of the matter. 1121, Regrettably, the International Law Commission (ILC) did not pursue the question of the legal regime of "historic waters" or "historic bays."

During the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 111) from 1973 to 1982, a "draft article concerning territorial sea: bays, the coasts of which belong to a single state, historic bays or other historic waters" was proposed by Colombia .21 However, the legal regimes of "historic waters" and "historic bays" were not considered during the Conference. There are two possible reasons for this. First, the twelve-mile territorial sea limit had generally been accepted by most coastal states, which made it possible to place the waters concerned under a state's sovereignty and jurisdiction. Second, the development of the legal regimes of the continental shelf, EEZ, and archipelagic waters may bring about a gradual phasing out and eventual elimination of the phenomenon of "historic" claims.22 As a consequence, the UNCLOS III merely reproduced the relevant articles of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone without defining the term "historic waters." Thus, no authoritative definition of "historic waters" can be found in any convention.

One scholar defined the term "historic waters" in his study of the legal regime of bays in international law, published in 1964, as:

waters over which the Coastal State, contrary to the generally applicable rules of international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, and over a substantial period of time, exercise sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the community of States.23

Another scholar classified claims to "historic waters" into three categories: 1) bays claimed by States which are greater in extent, or less in configuration, than standard bays; 2) areas of claimed waters linked to a coast by offshore features but which are not enclosed under the standard rules; and 3) areas of claimed seas which would, but for the claim, be high seas because they are not covered by any rules specially concerned with bays or delimitation of coastal waters (maria clausa). 24. Examples of the first category of "historic waters" claim include Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra as its "historic bay" in 1974. The closing line of the Gulf of Sidra is 296 miles in length, but the generally accepted length of the closing of a bay is 24 miles. Another example is the Russian claim to Peter the Great Bay as its "historic bay." The length of the closing line is 108 miles. Libya's claim has been challenged by countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. The Russian claim has been challenged by the United Kingdom, France, Japan, the United States, Sweden, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Examples of the second category of "historic waters" claim include Canada's claim to the waters of its Arctic archipelago. Tonga's claim to a rectangle of sea that the several groups of its islands frame as its "historic waters" is the best example of the third category of "historic waters". 25 In 1960, it was proposed that the ILC invite all the member states of the UN to send to the Secretariat documentation relating to "historic waters," including "historic bays," under each state's jurisdiction, and indicate the legal regime that supported the claims. However, the proposal was rejected out of fear that:

if Governments were invited to specify their claims to historic waters they might be tempted, as a matter of prudence, to protect their position by advancing all their claims, including possibly some new ones. They might also thereby commit themselves to a rigid attitude which could make a solution of the problem more difficult in the future. Furthermore, possibly exaggerated claims would not be a suitable basis for the formulation of principles on the matter. 26

In the study prepared by the UN Secretariat, the idea of including a list of "historic waters" was also considered, but, again, due to the concern that "such a list might induce States to overstate both their claims and their opposition to the claims of other States, and so give rise to unnecessary disputes," the idea was rejected." Therefore, it is difficult to tell precisely how many "historic waters" claims there are. Moreover, it is also difficult to examine the claimant states' justification of their claims or the basis for opposition to the claims by other states.The Legal Status of the Waters Enclosed by the "U"-shaped Line
The 1962 study of the juridical regime of historic waters concluded that the legal status of waters regarded as historic waters "would in principle depend on whether the sovereignty exercised in the particular case over the area by the claiming state and forming a basis for the claim, was sovereignty over internal waters or sovereignty over the territorial sea."" In other words, depending on the sovereignty exercised over the claimed waters by the claimant state, the waters could be considered either internal waters or territorial sea. In 1982, in the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, the International Court of Justice concluded that "general international law ... does not provide for a single 'regime' for 'historic waters' or 'historic bays,' but only for a particular regime for each of the concrete, recognized cases of 'historic waters' or 'historic bays" 29 However, it must be pointed out that the exercise of sovereignty over the claimed waters by a claimant state is only one of the elements in determining whether the historic title had been established. Other requirements also must be met to establish the historic title to the claimed waters.

During the UNCLOS 1, Japan proposed that "historic bays" be defined as "those bays over which coastal State or States have effectively exercised sovereign rights continuously for a period of long standing with explicit or implicit recognition of such practice by foreign States." The 1962 UN Study also suggested that at least three factors must be taken into consideration in determining whether a state has acquired a historic title to a maritime area. These factors are: 1) the exercise of authority over the area by the state claiming the historic right; 2) the continuity of this exercise of authority; and 3) the attitude of foreign states." In 1976, Colombia proposed a draft article to the Second Committee of the UNCLOS III, in which paragraph 1 reads:

A bay shall be regarded as historic only if it satisfies all of the following requirements: (a) that the State or States which claim it to be such shall have clearly stated that claim and shall be able to demonstrate that they have had sole possession of the waters of that bay continuously, peaceably and for a long time, by mean of acts of sovereignty or jurisdiction in the form of repeated and continuous official regulations on the passage of ships, fishing and other activities of the nationals or ships of other states; (b) that such practice is expressly or tacitly accepted by third States, particularly neighboring States. 32

Based upon the above arguments, it can be concluded that the general requirements for establishing historic title to a specific maritime area include: 1) exercise of authority over the area claimed; 2) continuity of the exercise of authority; and 3) the attitude of foreign states. In addition to these requirements, the burden of proof rests on the state which claims historic title to the questioned waters.

As already mentioned, Taipei claims the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line are China's historic waters but the legal status of the claimed waters has yet to be clarified by the ROC government. If the waters are claimed as internal waters, Taipei must prove that it has been continuously exercising sovereignty over the waters encircled by the "U"-shaped line for a considerable period of time in the same way it exercises sovereignty over other internal waters. If the waters are claimed as territorial sea, it must show that it has been continuously exercising sovereignty over the encircled waters for a long period of time in the same way it exercises sovereignty over other territorial seas. The same principles apply if the encircled waters are claimed as historic archipelagic waters.

Under the legal regime of "internal waters," a coastal state exercises full sovereignty over those waters which lie on the landward side of the baseline from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured and foreign ships enjoy no right of innocent passage through a state's internal waters, unless granted by the state as a privilege. A state's lakes, canals, rivers, ports, and harbors have exactly the same status as "inland waters."33

Should the waters of the South China Sea encircled by the "U"-shaped line and claimed as China's historic waters have the legal status of "internal waters"? First, the ROC government has never claimed the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the "U'-shaped line are "internal waters." Moreover, foreign vessels, including warships, have continuously and freely navigated the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the line since the map was published by the ROC in 1948. No action by the ROC has ever been taken to protest foreign vessels' passage through the enclosed waters. Considering these two reasons, it seems safe to conclude that the answer to the question is "no."

Article 3 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that "every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." Every state exercises sovereignty over its territorial sea and the only right which foreign ships enjoy in a state's territorial sea, apart from any specific treaty provisions which may exist, is the right of innocent passage. Foreign aircraft enjoy no right of innocent passage through the air space above the territorial sea. Can the waters of the South China Sea encircled by the "U"-shaped line be considered China's "territorial sea"?

First, foreign aircraft have been overlying the encircled waters since 1948 when the map was published. And foreign ships also have been enjoying freedom of navigation in the waters encircled by the "U"-shaped line, perhaps except in those waters measured 12 nautical miles from the baselines of those islands occupied by Taiwan.

Second, the Presidential Decree concerning the Territorial Sea and the EEZ, issued on October 8, 1979 defines the extent of the ROC's territorial sea as twelve nautical miles from its baselines. Although the islands and waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line were not mentioned in the Decree, as a corollary, it can be surmised that the ROC's territorial sea in the South China Sea is measured 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the claimed islands.

On October 7, 1992, the ROC's Ministry of Defense declared that foreign aircraft and ships are prohibited from entering into the waters and airspace above the waters measured 6,000 meters from the shorelines of the Pratas (Dongsha) and Taiping (Itu Aba) Island .34 These points demonstrate that the legal status of the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line, except those within 12 nautical miles from the baselines around the occupied islands, are not territorial sea. The concept of "archipelagic waters" is a new one in international law of the sea, created in the UNCLOS Ill. The waters enclosed by straight archipelagic baselines are archipelagic waters, which are neither internal waters nor territorial sea. An archipelagic state exercises sovereignty over its archipelagic waters. The sovereignty "extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil and the resources contained therein." 35 However, foreign ships and aircraft enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic sealanes and air routes over archipelagic waters. 36 Due to the fact that the legal regime of "archipelagic waters" was developed during the UNCLOS III and that the Chinese map enclosing the South China Sea with a "U"shaped line was published in 1948, it can hardly be argued that the area has the legal status of archipelagic waters. As it stands, the ROC has never had complete sovereignty over all the resources contained in the waters enclosed by the line, including the sea bed and subsoil. Furthermore, foreign ships and aircraft have enjoyed freedom of navigation and overflight, instead of the right of innocent passage or the right of archipelagic sea lanes or air route passage.

Since the ROC has never continuously exercised sovereignty over the waters of the South China Sea as internal waters, territorial sea, or archipelagic waters, it is safe to conclude that a historic title has not been established. The ROC has failed to meet the requirements that determine whether a historic title to a maritime area has been established. Moreover, the ROC government never asserted an official claim to the enclosed waters as historic waters prior to 1990. Therefore, the states whose interests would be affected by the claim need not respond nor take action to invalidate the ROC's claims.

If no historic title has ever been established, what is the purpose of the "U"-shaped line? It could simply be a boundary reference line, indicating that the islands of the South China Sea enclosed within the line belong to China. This is the conclusion of Steven K.T. Yu who argues that the purpose of drawing the "U"-shaped line was to show the public that the four large groups of islands in the South China Sea belong to China. 37 Likewise, Hungdah Chin uses the same argument and concludes that China can hardly establish a historic title to the waters enclosed by the line, given the fact that the ROC government has never made such claims and the ROC delegation to the UNCLOS I was silent on the matter .38

If the ROC's claim to the waters enclosed by the "U"shaped line as historic waters is ill-founded, what about the PRC's claim? Has the PRC ever claimed the waters of the South China Sea as China's "historic waters"? The answer to this appears to be "no." Although the "U"-shaped line is also used on maps published in the PRC, Beijing has never claimed the waters enclosed in the line as historic waters, even during the UNCLOS III. In practice, the PRC has never protested the exercise of the right of innocent passage and overflight of foreign ships and aircraft through the area, However, it must be pointed out that the PRC has continuously claimed ownership over the South China Sea islands since 1951. 39 Ownership of these islands will entitle Beijing to claim a variety of maritime zones in the South China Sea, which include internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, continental shelf, and EEZs.

Conclusion

ROC's current position on the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the "U"-shaped line is not acceptable to the other states involved in the South China Sea islands disputes, or to other states that make no claim to the South China Sea islands but whose interests are affected. The ROC would have difficulty proving that it has continuously exercised sovereignty over the enclosed waters since 1948 when the line was drawn and published. Or in other words, it will be very difficult for the ROC to establish a historic title to the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line, unless different criteria than those discussed above can be cited by the ROC in support of the claim.

The key issue in the dispute is not claims to "historic waters," but rather ownership of South China Sea Islands. In September 1958, the PRC declared that the breath of its territorial sea is twelve nautical miles and that this applies to the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha, and Nansha Islands as well. 40 On February 25, 1992, the National People's Congress adopted the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the PRC, in which the PRC's baseline for designating the territorial sea is determined with the method of straight baselines, formed by joining the various base points with straight lines. 41 The method is also applied to the South China Sea islands claimed by the PRC. According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, waters on the landward side of the baseline are part of the internal waters of the state. Accordingly, a large part of the waters of the South China Sea will become China's internal waters, subject to its sovereignty if Beijing chooses to enforce the law. Other countries will enjoy no rights at all, except the right of innocent passage. Moreover, areas 24 miles and 200 miles measured from the baselines will respectively become the PRC's contiguous zone and EEZ. If this becomes the case, the maritime areas subject to the PRC's sovereignty and jurisdiction will be enlarged to a point, even larger perhaps than the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line.

This could be one reason why Beijing has been silent on the question of "historic waters." Strategically speaking, there is no need for the PRC to play the role of "bad guy" when the ROC has already assumed the role. In Taiwan, among the Chinese scholars specializing in ocean law and politics, there is no consensus regarding the policy of claiming the enclosed waters as the ROC's historic waters. Moreover, diplomatically, it is quite likely that the ROC's claim will serve as an obstacle to Taiwan's "southward policy," of developing closer economic relations with Southeast Asian nations. 42 Due to the fact that no Southeast Asian nations formally recognize the ROC, and the real concern of the states in the region is the PRC, it is not likely that the ROC's claim that the South China Sea enclosed by the "U"-shaped line is China's "historical waters" will have much impact on the future development of the South China Sea islands dispute. But such a claim will hamper relations between Taipei and other Southeast Asian capitals. The real stumbling block to a peaceful solution of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea is the question of ownership, in whole or in part, of the South China Sea islands. In short, the question of China's claim to "historic waters" only complicates the effort to settle the dispute.

----------------------------------------------

Notes:
Yann-huei Song (LL.M., University of California Law School, Ph.D., Kent State University) teaches at the Institute of the Law of the Sea, National Taiwan Ocean University and is a research fellow at the Academia Sinica in Taipei. His research interests are the law of the sea and national ocean policy.
Peter Kien-hong Yu (Ph.D., New York University) teaches political science at National Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. He has published more than 30 articles and is the editor of Chinese Regionalism (Westview Press, 1994).
1 See Tzoh-zhou Yang, Nanhai fonyun [The South China Sea Imbroglio] (Taipei: Zhenzhong Publishers, 1993), 910. The "U"-shaped line is also shown on the maps included in the following publications: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Vietnam, White Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands (Saigon, 1975), 90; Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York and London, Methuen, 1982), 195; David G. Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 79; Jon M. Van Dyke and Dale L. Bennett, "Islands and the Delimitation of Ocean Space in the South China Sea." in Ocean Yearbook 10, ed. Elizabeth Mann Borgese, et al. (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1993), 55. See also Peter Kien-hong Yu, "Issues on the South China Sea," Chinese Yearbook on International Law and Affairs (1991-1992), 138-200.
2 Hurng-yu Chen, "The Boundary of the South China Sea Should be Drawn by Coordinates," Central Daily News (Taipei) (July 26, 1992):2.
3 See Kuan-chen Fu, "Nanhai "U"-shaped Boundary Line and the Unique Nature of the Waters within the Line," United Daily News (Taipei) (June 2, 1993):11.
4 See Choon-ho Park, "The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources," Ocean Development and International Law Journal 5, no. I (1 978):33 and Kuen-chen Fu, A Study of the Legal Status of the ROC's Historical Waters (Taipei: The Evaluation Commission, May 1993), 1.
5 See Han Jen Hua, ed., A Compilation of Historic Documents and Materials Relating to the South China Sea Islands (Beijing: Dong Fang Publishers, 1985), 172-179; Fu, A Study of the Legal Status of the ROC's Historical Waters.
6 The question of the exact purpose of the "U"-shape is unknown. The person who helped draw the line is reported to still be living in Nanjing, China. If the person is found, the question of why the line was drawn in such a way may be answered. See also Fu, A Study of the Legal Status of the ROC's Historical Waters.
7 See Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, "The 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention: Current Problems and Issues to the Republic of China," paper presented at "The Law of the Sea Convention: Issues and Prospects" sponsored by Southeast Asian Program on Ocean Law, Policy and Management (SEAPOL), Chiang Mai, Thailand, May 1991, 8.
8 See Kuan-chen Fu's statement in Wenti yu yanjiu [issues and Studies] 32, no. 8 (August 1993):6.
9 See International Legal Materials 21 (1982):1261-1354.
10 Chen, "The Boundary of the South China Sea Should be Drawn by Coordinates".
11 Hurng-yu Chen, "A Comparative Study of the South China Sea Policy and Thinking of the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait," paper presented at the symposium on Asian-Pacific Strategic Situation and Prospective, the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, May 18-19,1993, 11.
12 United Daily News (Taipei) (April 12, 1993): 1.
13 United Daily News (Taipei) (September 7, 1993):l.
14 Fu, A Study of the Legal Status of the ROC's Historical Waters, 3-4.
15 B.A. Hamzah, "Conflicting Jurisdiction Problems in the Spratlys: Scope for Conflict Resolution," paper presented to the Second Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bandung, Indonesia, 15-18 July 1991, 199-200.
16 See "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays," Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. 11 1962, 6-7.
17 Donat Pharand, Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 91.
18 See "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays," Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. 11 1962, 6. See also D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea Vol. 1, ed. I.A. Shearer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 419.
19 R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 2nd ed., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 36.
20 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays," Yearbook of the Intentional Law Commission Vol. 11, 1962, 6 and 25.
21 See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. V, 202-203.
22 Yehuda Z. Blum, "Current Developments: the Gulf of Sidra Incident," The American Journal of International Law 80 (1986):677.
23 L.H. Bouchez, The Regime of Bays in international Law (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 281.
24 D.P. O'Connell, The Intentional Law of the Sea Vol. 1, 417-418.
25 See Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea. 37-38; O'Connel, International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, 410, 418; Pharand, Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law, 107, 113-32.
26 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 5.
27 "The Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 26.
28 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 25.
29 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 36.
30 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 3.
31 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 13.
32 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. V, 203.
33 For provisions relating to "internal waters" see Article 5(l) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, and 50 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
34 United Daily News (Taipei) (October 14, 1992):l.
35 See Article 49 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
36 See Article 53 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
37 Steven K.T. Yu, "on the Legal Status of ROC's Nanhai U-shaped Line: Based Upon the Regime of 'Historic Waters'," Lilun yu zhengee Theory and Policy] 8, no. 1 (November 1993): 96.
38 Hungdah Chiu, "The Legal Regime of our Nanhai Historic Waters," Wenti yu Yanjiu [Issues & Studies] 32, no. 8 (August 1993):23.
39 In 1951, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai pointed out that the South China Sea Islands have always been China's territory. See Lou Yuru and Zeng Chengkui, eds., Dangdai Zhonqquo De Haiyang Shiye [contemporary China's Marine Undertakings] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1985), 446.
40 See Myron H. Nordquist and Choon-ho Park, North America and Asia-Pacific and the Development of the Law of the Sea: The People's Republic of China (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1981), 6.
41 Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, the UN, The Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 21 (August 1992), 24-27.42 United Daily News (Taipei) (November 13, 1993):l and (November 24, 1993):2.

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Kabalyero ng Disyerto- "Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? Dios ko, Dios ko bakit mo ako pinabayaan?"

by: desertknightfm Rhojel



Golgotha o Place of the Skull kung pagmamasdan maiigi ang bundok na kung saan si Kristo ay pinako ay nahahawig sa mukha ng isang bungo ng tao ang gilid ng bundok. Ito ay matatagpuan sa Jerusalem.

 "At nang malapit na ang oras na ikasiyam ay sumigaw si Jesus ng malakas na tinig, na sinasabi: Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? sa makatuwid baga'y, Dios ko, Dios ko bakit mo ako pinabayaan?" (Matthew27:46)

Kadalasan may mga pagkakataon na pag di na natin kaya ang isang pagsubok sa buhay ay nasisisi natin ang D_s sa ating pagkabigo at nasasambit ang mga katagang nabanggit ni Jesus habang siya ay nakapako. Ngunit ang pagbigkas ng mga salitang ito ni Jesus ay hindi nangahuhulugan na si Siya ay nagsisisi bagkus ito ay isang kapahayagan ng kanyang pagiging tunay na Messiah.

Ang lahat ng nangyari kay Jesus sa mga huling araw ng kanyang pagpapakasakit ay katuparan ng mga propesiya ng isang tunay na Messiah, isang tagapagligtas at tagapagpalaya sa pagkaalipin sa pamamagitan ng Kristyanismo.

Ang Messiah ay isang taong itinalaga ng D_s na mamuno para sa pagpapalaya o pagliligtas. Bagama't ang inaasahan nila na Messiah ay ang magpapalaya sa kanila sa pananakop ng Roma kaya't mas pinili nila si Barabas na palayain sapagkat sa panahon na iyon si Barabas at ang mga tulisan na kasama ni Jesus na pinako sa krus ay kasapi ng grupong rebolusyonaryong Zealots na nakikipag laban para sa kasarinlan ng Israel. 

Tingnan ang buong istorya sa Kabalyero ng Disyerto 8 at naniniwala sila na ang sinuman mamuno sa kilusang ito ay tinalagang maging Messiah ng D_s.

Ang Pagpapatunay Na Si Jesus Ang Tunay Na Messiah

Isa sa mga propesiya ng pagdating ng Messiah ay ang pagbaba ni Elijah o Elias mula sa kalangitan. Iilan lang ang nakakaalam sa mga Israelita tungkol dito maliban sa mga Saserdote.

1 Sapagka't, narito, ang araw ay dumarating, na nagniningas na parang hurno; at ang lahat na palalo, at ang lahat na nagsisigawa ng kasamaan ay magiging parang dayami, at ang araw na dumarating ay susunog sa kanila, sabi ng Panginoon ng mga hukbo, na anopa't hindi magiiwan sa kanila ng kahit ugat ni sanga man.
2 Nguni't sa inyo na nangatatakot sa aking pangalan ay sisikat ang araw ng katuwiran na may kagalingan sa kaniyang mga pakpak; at kayo'y magsisilabas, at magsisiluksong parang guya mula sa silungan.
3 At inyong yayapakan ang masasama; sapagka't sila'y magiging abo sa ilalim ng mga talampakan ng inyong mga paa sa kaarawan na aking gawin, sabi ng Panginoon ng mga hukbo.
4 Alalahanin ninyo ang kautusan ni Moises na aking lingkod na aking iniutos sa kaniya sa Horeb para sa buong Israel, sa makatuwid baga'y ang mga palatuntunan at mga kahatulan.
5 Narito, aking susuguin sa inyo si Elias na propeta bago dumating ang dakila at kakilakilabot na kaarawan ng Panginoon. (Malachi 4:1-5)

Si Elijah o Elias ang isa sa mga propeta na sinundo ng karwahe mula sa langit (2Kings 2:11) at ayon sa propesiya, ang isa sa palatandaan ng pagdating ng Messiah ay pagbalik muli ni Elijah sa lupa upang pagkalooban ng kapangyarihan at karapatan ang isang Messiah. Ito ang dahilan kung bakit ang mga Israelita o Hudyo ay di naniniwala na si Jesus ang Messiah magpasahanggang ngayun sapagkat wala sinuman sa kanila maliban sa mga apostoles ang nakasaksi sa pagdating ni Elijah upang siya ay italagang Messiah.

Ang Pagpapataw ng Kapangyarihan at Pagtatalaga kay Jesus bilang Messiah.

Dahil mauunang dumating ang tagapagtalaga upang ihanda ang daraanan ng Messiah ito ang isa sa mga propesiya na natupad sa katauhan ng anak nila Zacarias at Elisabeth na si John The Baptist na naunang ipanganak kay Jesus ng 6 na buwan.

Ang pagtatalaga ni John The Baptist sa kanyang pinsan buo na si Jesus ay naganap sa ilog Jordan. (Matthew 3:13-17).

Si John the Baptist ay pinugutan ng ulo sa utos ni haring Herodes ngunit muli sila nagkita ni Jesus sa bundok na naguusap sa  katauhan ni Elijah kasama si Moises at ito ay nasaksihan ni Pedro, Santiago, at ng kanyang kapatid na si John.

1At pagkaraan ng anim na araw, ay isinama ni Jesus si Pedro, at si Santiago, at si Juan na kapatid niya, at sila'y dinalang bukod sa isang mataas na bundok:
2 At nagbagong-anyo siya sa harap nila; at nagliwanag ang kaniyang mukha na katulad ng araw, at pumuting tulad sa ilaw ang kaniyang mga damit.
3 At narito, napakita sa kanila si Moises at si Elias na nakikipagusap sa kaniya.
4 At sumagot si Pedro, at sinabi kay Jesus, Panginoon, mabuti sa atin ang tayo'y dumito: kung ibig mo, ay gagawa ako rito ng tatlong tabernakulo; isa ang sa iyo, at isa ang kay Moises, at isa ang kay Elias.
5 Samantalang nagsasalita pa siya, narito, ang isang maningning na alapaap ay lumilim sa kanila: at narito, ang isang tinig na mula sa alapaap, na nagsasabi, Ito ang sinisinta kong Anak, na siya kong kinalulugdan; siya ang inyong pakinggan.
6 At nang marinig ito ng mga alagad, ay nangasubasub sila, at lubhang nangatakot.
7 At lumapit si Jesus at sila'y tinapik, at sinabi, Mangagbangon kayo, at huwag kayong mangatakot.
8 At sa paglingap ng kanilang mga mata, ay wala silang nakitang sinoman, kundi si Jesus lamang.
9 At habang sila'y nagsisibaba mula sa bundok, ay iniutos sa kanila ni Jesus, na nagsasabi, Huwag ninyong sabihin kanino mang tao ang pangitain, hanggang sa ang Anak ng tao ay ibangon sa mga patay.
10 At tinanong siya ng kaniyang mga alagad, na nangagsasabi, Bakit nga sinasabi ng mga eskriba na kinakailangang pumarito muna si Elias?
11 At sumagot siya, at sinabi, Katotohanang si Elias ay paririto, at isasauli ang lahat ng mga bagay:
12 Datapuwa't sinasabi ko sa inyo, na naparito na si Elias, at hindi nila siya nakilala, kundi ginawa nila sa kaniya ang anomang kanilang inibig. Gayon din naman ang Anak ng tao ay magbabata sa kanila.
13 Nang magkagayo'y napagunawa ng mga alagad na si Juan Bautista ang sa kanila'y sinasabi niya. (Matthew 17:1-13) 

Ito ang pagpapatunay at dahilan bakit niya binigkas ang pangalan Elijah upang ipaalala ang propesiya.

“Eli, Eli, lema sabachthani?”  "Elias, Elias, Dios ko, Dios ko bakit mo ako pinabayaan?"

Sa kauna unahang huling wika ni Hesus ito ang pasimula ng katuparan ng mga propesiya na mangyayari sa Kristo o Messiah.

"Dios ko, Dios ko, bakit mo ako pinabayaan?..." Psalm 22:1

"Silang lahat na nangakakita sa akin ay tinatawanang mainam ako..." Psalm 22:7

"...lahat ng aking mga buto ay nangapapalinsad..." Psalm 22:14

"...kinulong ako ng pulutong ng mga manggagawa ng masama; binutasan nila ang aking mga kamay at ang aking mga paa." Psalm 22:16

"Aking maisasaysay ang lahat ng aking mga buto; kanilang minamasdan, at pinapansin ako" Psalm 22:17

"Hinapak nila ang aking mga kasuutan sa gitna nila, at kanilang pinagsapalaran ang aking kasuutan" Psalm 22:18

Ang lahat ng propesiyang ito ay sinulat ilan daan taon na ang nakakalipas bago mangyari ang pagpapako kay Jesus.

Kailanman ang D_s ay hindi nagpabaya sa atin sa kabila ng ating pagkakasala at kakulangan.

" Isang makabuluhan at mapagpalang Huwebes Santo sa inyong lahat."